Parallel to the recent escalation in Ukraine, the army in Belarus has entered the mobilization of its armed forces and begun to erect fortifications. Additionally, a border zone has been set up with Russia at critical sections. It also has been reported that coordination for the deployment of Russian paratroopers is going on.
As has been stated earlier, Russia is planning to transfer its 1st Guards Tank Army for “field” tests to western Belarus, the official date had been given with September 2017. In regard to recent Russian war tactics it has to be kept in mind that Russian regular units always have been used as back-up forces – after the adversary already had been weakened by “hybrid” forces.
Previous “Zapad”-exercises were directed to Scandinavia, the Baltic states and Poland (see for example here for a discussion of Zapad-2013). Edward Lucas wrote in June 2015: “A snap drill in Kaliningrad in December caught NATO completely by surprise. Much larger exercises inMarch, involving probably 33,000 troops, took place in response to a notional Western attempt to create a ‘Maidan’ uprising in Moscow. The scenario included the speedy seizure of northern Norway,the Åland islands (demilitarized Finnish territory, populated by Swedish-speakers), the Swedish island of Gotland and the Danish island of Bornholm. If carried out successfully, control of those territorieswould make it all but impossible for NATO allies to reinforce the Baltic states.”
Additionally, there has been information on possible “Maidan”-like protests in Minsk.
As of mid-February 2017 the situation can be described as a larger military mobilization – both in Russia and Belarus. The mobilization in Belarus has been officially sold as having the purpose of territorial defense. But it has to be reminded here that Belarus can be considered an “extension” of the Russian western military district given the Russian influences (some have claimed the majority of officers was feeling they would belong to Russia; also the higher command of the army has a Russian background).
As of 14 February the mobilization in the Russian western military district includes fuel supply transports, reserve call-ups, naval bases, artillery units (according to official reports 10.000 men with 2000 units of equipment, including “Iskander”-units), paratrooper checks etc – the total number of mobilized in this region can be around 100.000 men – see here for updates.
As of 1 March there are again combined paratrooper exercises near the border of Estonia (Pskov Oblast, officially around a thousand men from Russia and Belarus). Also, coodination meetings have been taking place in Sochi (under the cover of military winter games last week; Lukashenka also participating). Near St. Petersburg, ground helicopter crew tests have started, plus Minsk saw a “rehearsal” for the police day (while Russian speznaz/paratroopers had been reported to have been present in the city in order to organize upcoming “exercises”).
The drills in Belarus were to continue in the first week of March, including reservists. Plus, Russia not only tested paratroopers from Belarus and Russia (according to official reports some 600 men and three military vehicles “jumped” in a coordinated move). Additionally, some dozen ships went out to the Baltic Sea for an artillery test (and later returned to Kaliningrad); while other artillery units trained at Luga (some 50km east of the border with Estonia).
As of mid-March it can be stated that the last weeks have seen massive airborne training (Orenburg, Rjazan and other locations). As of now, some paratroopers are already on the move (e.g. Pskov units officially to Dzankoj at the administrative border with Crimea). Also it had been officially stated that paratroopers from Tula are expected western Belarus in the next few weeks (or days). It can be suggested that other units are moving as well.
Moreover, there have been reports in the last days that suggested the presence of Russian speznaz at the recent protest locations in Belarus.
Finland in the last weeks has speeded up training against hybrid scenarios of Russian warfare – Russia for its part this week will be massively present with its airforce, officially more than 50 teams of its tactical aviation, some hundred km from the Finnish border (Lagoda area; among other shipments into the region).
Update 21 March: As suspected Lukashenka echos the Moscow-line and claims that armed “militants” have been arrested, supported by Lithuania and Poland; also blaming Ukraine of training them militarily. In the meantime, Ukraine has stepped up security at its border with Belarus. Activities in and around Kaliningrad continue to be high; an unusual high number of US reconaissance flights has been taking place in the last two weeks. On 20 March, the Swedish parliament had an evacuation (war) exercise, the first since 1997. Also, nuclear bunkers on Gotland will be prepared for use. On 23 March, there was information on another iodine-leak – the first having been communicated in January – measured near the Kola Peninsula. This could suggest Russian testing of “modified” nuclear weapons to be used in possible future war operations in order to spread maximum public (media) panic; but actual damage not being sufficient to provoke a full-scale nuclear war.
Update 24 March: There has been information of additional units of Russian paratroopers (Ivanovo) being transported to Belarus. Lukashenka has continued to push the western detabilization narrative amid further arrests (some 300 persons from the opposition already arrested). Both the country’s armed forces and police have entered an enhanced stage of readiness.
Update 12 April: Protests in Belarus have calmed down, while authorities accused some 30 persons of creating an “illegal armed group“. Belsat reported that Tula-paratroopers had arrived to Brest on 11 April: “Representatives of the 38th Independent Guards Airborne Brigade of the Belarusian army and a company from Russia’s 106th Guards Airborne Division are taking part in the exercise at Brestski training ground near the Belarusian city of Brest.” The Russian defense ministry on 10 April mentioned the presence (of the infamous as for their participation in the summer 2014 invasion in Ukraine) 76th Pskov division at Brest; officially to coordinate “Slavjanskoe bratstvo-2017”. Brest sits at the border with Poland, at a crucial strategic location.
On 8/9 April, the Russian defense ministry had boasted to have trained some additional 5000 paratroopers in the “winter training period” – and that until 17 May some 50.000 men would be parachuted. In this regard we have seen busy preparations of the Russian airforce in the last weeks. On 11 April it was communicated that the western military disctrict’s units will be mobilized, including all regions (and possibly also Belarus); amongst additional activities of the Baltic Fleet.